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Transaction Costs and Fisheries Co-Management





Abstract   Fisheries co-management as an alternative to centralized command
and control fisheries management is often suggested as a solution to the prob-
lems of fisheries resource use conflicts and overexploitation. This paper
highlights some elements of the transaction costs under a fisheries co-manage-
ment system. The transaction costs can be categorized into three major cost
items: (i) information costs, (ii) collective fisheries decision-making costs, and
(iii) collective operational costs. An approach to measuring transaction costs of
fisheries co-management systems both in static and dynamic processes is also
proposed. There is a need to empirically evaluate the nature of the transaction
costs involved in fisheries co-management institutions as a basis for evaluating
the efficiency or net benefits of co-managed fisheries compared to centrally
managed fisheries.
Key words   Collective fisheries decision-making costs, collective operational
costs, fisheries co-management, information costs, institutions, transaction costs.
Introduction
The search for sustainable, efficient, and equitable ways for managing fisheries has
been a long and difficult one. The conventional approach for managing fisheries is
to acquire property rights over the fishery through legislation by the state. The state
then parcels out rights and establishes rules (regulations) of use for the fishers. The
state regulates the resource. The outcome of such an approach has been to greatly
reduce the capacity of local fishing communities, to manage coastal resources, and
to provide a minimal role for the fishers to participate in the management of the re-
source. This has often resulted in antagonism between government and fishers. It has
made it difficult for government fisheries agencies to communicate to fishers the
need for and benefit of management of fishery resources, and for fishers to commu-
nicate their needs to government and to fully participate in management.
The increased difficulties faced by central authorities in preventing resource
depletion, despite the regulations in place, has caused resource managers as well as
scholars, to look more closely at both the need for fisher participation and the role
of institutional arrangements (rights and rules) in fisheries management (Jentoft andAbdullah, Kuperan, and Pomeroy 104
McCay 1995; Dubbink and Van Vliet 1996; McCay and Jentoft 1996). The current
interest in co-management of fisheries as an alternative to the heavily centralized
management of fisheries is an example of a worldwide change in the way fisheries
management is being approached, at least in the current decade. Co-management is
expected to effectively address some of the problems of fishery overexploitation,
dissipation and redistribution of resource rents, limited fisher participation, and con-
flicts among the different groups of resource users. One of the functions of co-man-
agement systems is the shifting of some control, administration, and enforcement
from the central authorities to the users (fishers) and user community. This reduction
in authority and responsibility by the central agencies through co-management is al-
leged to lead to improved resource use outcomes as measured by economic effi-
ciency, equity, and ecosystem (natural and human) sustainability.
One of the purported advantages of co-management compared to centralized
management is that it will reduce transaction costs—the cost of gaining information
about the resource and what users are doing with it, reaching agreements and coor-
dinating with others in the group with respect to use of the resource, and enforcing
agreements that have been reached. Hanna (1995) points out that a centralized ap-
proach is often associated with low program design costs, but high implementation,
monitoring, and enforcement costs as the management regime may have little legiti-
macy with user groups. A co-management approach, on the other hand, is associated
with high program design costs, as effective participation is time consuming and
therefore costly. However, co-management is likely to lead to lower implementation,
monitoring, and enforcement costs as legitimacy of the regime is greater.
A fisheries co-management system seeks to perform a variety of management
functions (Pinkerton 1989) to achieve its objectives. To perform these functions, the
management institutions at both the government and community levels will incur
costs. An important factor that has not been explored in the fisheries co-management
literature is the integral involvement of transaction costs in institutional and organi-
zational arrangements. In essence, institutional arrangements, which are a set of
rights and rules of behavior for the use of resources (Ostrom 1990), arise out of the
need to internalize externalities. In fisheries, the externalities arise out of the com-
mon property and the depletable nature of the resource. Societies choose the best
structure available for accommodating the externality given their historical develop-
ment. Both market and nonmarket institutions develop to handle the externalities,
but all forms of institutions incur transaction costs to some degree. In theory, mar-
kets for accommodating externality problems will naturally arise if transaction costs
are sufficiently low (Demsetz 1964, 1967).
This paper will highlight some of the transaction costs that may either increase
or decrease the total costs of managing fisheries under a co-management system. An im-
plied assumption here is that the transaction costs of co-management institutions are
equal to, or lower than, centralized government-based fisheries management systems.
This is a critical policy question as governments evaluate the resources provided for
fisheries management and the benefits obtained. The problem, however, is that it is
rarely possible to know, a priori, whether the transaction costs of centralized govern-
ment managed fisheries institutions are higher or lower than co-managed institutions.
Understanding the components of transaction costs in a fisheries co-manage-
ment regime is, therefore, imperative for at least two reasons. First, there is a pau-
city of literature on the transaction costs in a fisheries co-management system; and
second, there is a need to assess outcomes and costs of achieving the outcomes from
the new system. In fisheries co-management, there is a shift of costs from society to
collective groups and individuals, and also a shift in the magnitude of transaction
costs of operating a different management system. By identifying the major compo-
nents of transaction costs in this management system, fisheries managers can have aTransaction Costs and Fisheries Co-Management 105
clearer idea of the total costs involved in implementing the management option. In
doing so, the net benefits of the management option can then be accurately evaluated
and compared with the existing management system.
The objective of this paper is to explore the elements of transaction costs in co-
managed fisheries and build an agenda for empirical research in this important area.
We will begin with a discussion of a few fundamental definitions of co-management
and property rights. This is followed by a brief discussion of the theory and defini-
tion of transaction costs. The next section is a discussion of the three major transac-
tion costs in fisheries co-management. An approach to measuring transaction costs is
given in the fourth section. Policy implications and conclusions are presented in the
final section of the paper.
Fisheries Co-Management and Common Property
Fisheries co-management is defined as the sharing of responsibility and authority
between the government and the community of local fishers to manage a fishery
(Pomeroy and Williams 1994; Sen and Nielsen 1996). Co-management covers vari-
ous partnership arrangements and degrees of power-sharing and integration of local
and centralized management systems. There is a hierarchy of co-management ar-
rangements from those in which the fishers are merely consulted by the government
before regulations are introduced, to those in which fishers design, implement, and
enforce laws and regulations with advice and assistance from the government (figure 1).
The amount of responsibility and authority that the state and various local levels
have will differ and depend upon country-specific and site-specific conditions, and
will ultimately be a political decision.
The analysis of co-management falls in the area of common property theory
(Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1989; McCay 1993; Baland and Platteau 1996). Co-man-
agement arrangements can be analyzed in terms of who holds what kind of property-
rights over a resource or who controls the fishery. Common property resources share two
important characteristics. The first is excludability, or the control of access. The physi-
cal nature of the resource is such that controlling access by potential users is a prob-
lem and may be costly. The second characteristic is subtractability; that is, the fish
harvesting activities of one fisher subtracts from or lowers the catch per unit fishing
effort of other fishers. These two problems often create a divergence between indi-
vidual and collective economic rationality which, unless mitigated, leads to a “trag-
edy of the commons,” a situation that typically occurs in the absence of property
rights to the resource (Feeny et al. 1990; Hanna, Folke, and Maler 1996).
Common property regimes can be effective at controlling access to the resource.
Most common property regimes are based upon some form of access control and
some form of institutional design to regulate use and to minimize the subtractability
problem. The literature on common property regimes recognizes that solutions exist
through three basic kinds of property rights regimes: (i) state property or state gov-
ernance indicates that rights to the resource are controlled exclusively by govern-
ment agencies on behalf of all the citizens, (ii) communal property or common prop-
erty means that the resource is held by an identifiable community of users who can
exclude others and regulate their own use, and (iii) private property refers to a situa-
tion in which an individual or a corporate body has the right to exclude others and
regulate the use of the resources (Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992; Hanna, Folke, and
Maler 1996; McCay and Acheson 1987; McCay 1993; Bromley 1991).
Common property regimes as collective resource management systems have
been shown to develop when a group of individuals are highly dependent on a
resource(s) and when the availability of the resource(s) is uncertain or limitedAbdullah, Kuperan, and Pomeroy 106
Figure 1.  A Hierarchy of Co-Management Arrangements (after Berkes 1994)
(Runge 1992). If the resource problem is repeatedly experienced, such as low or no
catch, and if it exists within a single community of users, the fishers are likely to
develop a collective institutional arrangement (rights and rules) to deal with the
problem. In the face of uncertainty in resource availability, group members are will-
ing to trade-off some benefit from individual use of the resource, for the collective
assurance that the resource will be used in a more equitable and sustainable manner
(Gibbs and Bromley 1989). Institutions, through rules, provide incentives for the
group members to take certain actions to achieve the desired outcome. The develop-
ment of institutional arrangements requires an investment of time by the members of
the community. Coordination and information activities are initial aspects of build-
ing institutions (Ostrom 1992). The transaction process of developing institutions
will have costs. For common property regimes, these costs are part of the collective
decision-making process.
As Jentoft (1989) put it, “how then is co-management to be distinguished from
other common property management systems, such as government regulation or
community-initiated regulation?” The answer is that co-management is a middle
course between pure state property and pure communal property regimes. The three
property rights regimes mentioned above (plus the open access regime or the ab-
sence of property rights) are ideal, analytical types—they do not exist in the real
world. Rather, resources tend to be held in overlapping combinations of these four
regimes. Strictly speaking, pure communal property systems and community-based
coastal resource management (CBCRM) are always embedded in state property sys-
tems and derive their strength from them. Co-management may involve the recogni-
tion and legitimization of traditional or customary local-level management systems.Transaction Costs and Fisheries Co-Management 107
A certain degree of community-based resource management may be a part of co-
management.
Fishers’ ability to organize for collective action has a number of prerequisites,
essentially involving the question of local institutional arrangements. Not all groups
of fishers have appropriate local institutional arrangements. In such cases, any co-
management initiative will start with institution-building. The establishment and
successful operation of fisheries co-management can be a complex, long-term, and
costly process. The costs for individuals to participate in co-management (time and
money) may outweigh the expected benefits. Community organizing, for example,
can take from three to five years before a self-sufficient organization is in place, on
the basis of cases in the Philippines (Carlos and Pomeroy 1996), and five to ten
years on the basis of a case in St. Lucia, West Indies (Smith and Berkes 1993).
The delegation of significant responsibility and authority to manage the fisher-
ies may be one of the most difficult tasks in establishing co-management systems.
While governments may be willing to call for more user participation, they must
also establish commensurate rights and authorities and devolve some of their own pow-
ers. Government resource managers are often reluctant to share their authority or parts
of it. Many managers fear a loss of political power or infringement on their profes-
sional and scientific turf. Fishers will need to take some of the responsibility of con-
vincing managers of their ability to undertake local-level resource management. In
all cases of co-management, the ultimate authority is held by the government.
Transaction Costs in Fisheries Co-Management
Transaction cost economics was first discussed in the economic literature by Ronald
Coase (1937) in his seminal paper “The Nature of the Firm.” Coase proposed that
the decision whether to have a transaction within a firm or in the market place will
be determined by transaction costs (Coase 1937). He suggested that the form of con-
trol chosen (firm or market) would tend to be the one with the lowest transaction
costs. This early analysis eventually spawned a great deal of theoretical work known
as transaction cost economics. This theory suggests, if given a choice, individuals
will choose the set of institutions, contracts, or transactions that will minimize the
(transaction) costs of doing business. Coase went on to say that a contract that offers the
lowest transaction costs will tend to be used the most to govern a set of actions. How-
ever, as Libecap (1991) points out, having lower transaction cost is a necessary rather
than a sufficient condition for adoption. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine
transaction costs when evaluating the potential of new institutions as alternatives to
existing institutions. A number of useful definitions of transaction costs are avail-
able in the literature such as Williamson (1973, 1975, 1981), Randall (1972),
Dahlman (1979), North (1990), Davis (1986), Barzel (1989), and Cheung (1969).
When multiple individuals are involved in environments where complex activi-
ties must be coordinated across space and over time, they may attempt to reduce the
substantial uncertainties they face through various forms of implicit or explicit
agreements. These contracts involve costly activities expended in the processes of
achieving agreements before and continuing to coordinate activities after an initial
agreement is reached in an uncertain environment. Williamson (1985) identifies the
costs associated with contracting activities as ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Us-
ing the generic of the Williamson’s transaction cost economics, the transaction cost in
fisheries co-management can, therefore, be broadly categorized into three major cost
items: (i) information costs, (ii) collective fisheries decision-making costs, and (iii)
collective operational costs. The first two categories are ex ante transaction cost
while the latter is defined as the ex post transaction cost. This breakdown is largelyAbdullah, Kuperan, and Pomeroy 108
Figure 2.  Schematic Flow Diagram of Transaction Costs in Fisheries Co-Management
based on anecdotal information, and the schematic flow diagram of the transaction
costs in fisheries co-management is shown in figure 2. The transaction costs arise
from the problems of information, coordination, and control that stem primarily
from the fact that fisheries resource management decisions involve multiple actors
with different interest in long-term, interdependent, and uncertain processes.
The key factor that differentiates centralized management from co-management
is the level of user participation in the design and implementation of the manage-
ment activities; namely, resource assessment, determining management objectives,
selecting management measures, allocating the resource among users, allocation of
the resource over time, and enforcing regulations. The extent to which the state al-
lows for user participation for each of the management activities determines the
spectrum of different co-management arrangements possible between the state and
the users. The expected level of transaction costs involved for each of  the different
management activities under a pure centralized management system compared with
a co-management system with a high level of user participation is shown in table 1.
However, the actual costs of these management activities can only be ascertained
through further empirical work.
Information Costs
Whichever management system, centralized or co-management, information for
managing the system must be collected and organized for decision making. The suc-
cess of a management system depends on the amount and types of information avail-
able to both decision-makers and participants or resource users. Decision-makers
concerned with fisheries resource management may have different types of informa-
tion available to them; likewise, resource users have a variety of information avail-
able to them. The information available to those two groups may vary and may not
be shared. The kind of information we are referring to is not easily accessible to ev-
eryone; for example, size of fish stocks, number of stakeholders, and preferencesTransaction Costs and Fisheries Co-Management 109
Table 1
Transaction Costs in Centralized and Co-Managed Systems
Centralized
Resource Management Activities Management Co-management
Information seeking low high
Decision making and setting management objectives low high
Resource distribution among users high low
Resource distribution over time high low
Monitoring, enforcement and compliance high low
Resource maintenance high low
about allocation of the resource among stakeholders and other interested parties
over time. Once this information is acquired, it has to be sorted and organized in
such a manner for it to be meaningful to all users. The information search and acqui-
sition costs are costly, and they are closely related to strategic and coordination
costs. Since participants in fisheries co-management systems face asymmetrical in-
formation problems, they may behave strategically or opportunistically to maximize
their own welfare in providing information to management authorities and thus aim
to avoid social and economic responsibilities altogether. This strategic and opportu-
nistic behavior, coupled with difficulties stakeholders incur in acquiring and inte-
grating information used in reaching decisions, is a possible reason for much higher
transaction costs under a co-managed system as shown in table 1.
Decision-Making Costs
One of the many challenges facing the fisheries co-management regime is how to
get the fishers to reach some level of consensus on certain contract or collective ac-
tions with regards to resource management. The collective fisheries decision-making
costs include dealing with fisher’s problems; participating in meetings; making poli-
cies, rules and regulations; communicating decisions to the community; and coordi-
nating tasks with local and central fisheries authorities. As individual fishers have
different sets of information and interests which seldom match, it will take a special
effort just to bring them together, let alone reach an agreement on some uncertain
processes. Even if they agree to meet, some actors will behave strategically or op-
portunistically so that they obtain maximum benefits from the proposed project. In
the event that they manage to draw up “acceptable” rules and regulations to all re-
source users, they still have to communicate the decisions to their peers and some
form of coordinating mechanism with local and central fisheries authorities has to
be planned. Coordinating actions of diverse actors requires that considerable time
and resources be devoted to the process of gaining agreement, monitoring activities,
and evaluating performances. These are some of the transaction costs in the collec-
tive fisheries decision-making process which are expected to be higher under a cen-
tralized management system as shown in table 1.
Operations Costs
The third major component of transaction costs is the collective fisheries operations
costs. This component can, in fact, form the strongest counterargument for the cen-Abdullah, Kuperan, and Pomeroy 110
tralized resource management system. It is argued that if the resource is to be man-
aged by both the central agency and the community, the operations costs can be
quite substantial to ensure that rules are followed, conflicts among users are re-
solved, and the reward system from the new institution is apt to be fair and equi-
table. As the reward system is designed or structured by the community, it is more
likely to be acceptable to the community. There is validity to this reasoning. Opera-
tions cost can be quite significant in carrying out a management regime. Operations
cost comes in three forms: (i) monitoring, enforcement, and compliance costs; (ii)
resource maintenance costs; and (iii) resource distribution cost.
Monitoring, enforcement, and compliance costs include the monitoring of fish-
eries rules, monitoring the fishing areas, catch record management, fishing inputs,
conflict management, and resolutions and sanctions for rule violations. In resource
maintenance costs, the transaction costs result from fishing rights protection, stock
enhancement activities, and resource assessment work to ensure that the stocks in
the area are not overexploited. Resource distribution costs include the cost of dis-
tributing the fishing rights to the appropriate stakeholders and costs of managing the
participation of the stakeholders and administering the rights to the fishery.
Monitoring, enforcement, and compliance costs in fisheries management alone
can be substantial. As an example, in Malaysia, where a centralized fisheries man-
agement system is in place, the monitoring, enforcement, and compliance costs
as measured by government expenditure increased from about 5% of total fish-
eries development expenditure during the 1976–80 period to about 16% during
the 1986–90 period. This amounts to about MR7.753 (US$3.10) million during
1976–80 period and MR41.564 (US$16.63) million during the 1986–90 period.
For the 1991–95 period, a sum of MR80.797 (US$32.32) million was allocated for
monitoring, enforcement, and compliance expenditure for the Malaysian Fisheries
Department (Kuperan 1994).
It may be argued that under a co-management system, the enforcement and
compliance costs may be lower as there may be increased compliance realized from
the increased legitimacy of the regulations and allocation procedures adopted by the
community (see for example Hanna 1995). But enforcement and monitoring requires
substantial resources, and there are likely to be economies of scale from the use of
monitoring and enforcement vessels by a larger fishing community as represented by
the centralized management system.
The co-management system, therefore, represents a shift in the burden of fi-
nancing the costs of governance of common property resources from the central or
public purse to groups or individuals involved in managing the resource. This shift
in the costs from the central authorities to user groups has implications for overall
management costs and the capability of user groups to bear such costs. The benefits
from such a shift are improved compliance and lower management costs. It is the
ability of user groups, especially in overexploited fisheries, to bear the cost of gov-
ernance from the minimal rents from such fisheries that is often questionable.
In many fisheries systems the costs of maintaining and enhancing the resource
through material interventions involves large investments and long gestation periods
to realize the benefits. These costs are often incurred by national agencies in most
countries. A move towards co-management systems will call for the community to
spend resources for such maintenance and replenishment interventions. Most com-
munities will be reluctant to incur such costs as the benefits may often accrue to fu-
ture generations and others since fish are migratory resources. Such investments are
important for long-term sustainability of resources and may not be considered in co-
managed systems.
New institutions often require members to sacrifice time and effort to bring
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stitutions flow to all members irrespective of participation, the free rider and public
goods nature of institutions can pose problems for co-managed institutions. Unless
some form of benefit is readily available to members who sacrifice their time, the
durability of the institutions will be at stake. In addition, the equity and fairness as-
pects of the allocation of the benefits and costs of running the institutions will be
affected. In overexploited fisheries the resource rents might be so low that fishers
may not be able to maintain the institution.
The costs mentioned above may not be readily apparent, but their identification
is crucial in determining the sustainability of fisheries co-management systems. In
centrally based management systems, the funds for operating and maintaining the
system usually come from the general tax revenues, and the element of cross subsi-
dies from other sectors of the economy may be in effect. In co-managed systems, the
costs may have to be borne by the resource users and the community and obtaining
subsidies from another sector may be difficult. A thorough examination of the often
hidden transactions costs is necessary in an assessment of the feasibility of co-man-
agement as an alternative fisheries management approach.
Transition Costs
As mentioned earlier the process of establishing a co-managed system involves time
of at least three to five years. The stages are: (i) devising and creating the institu-
tions and obtaining information for decision making; (ii) implementing the decisions
through dissemination of information and explanation of how the community-based
system will work; and (iii) maintaining, monitoring, and ensuring compliance with
institutional rules and adjusting rules as conditions in the fishery change. These
stages are shown in figure 3, where the co-management process moves from the
recognition of the inadequacy of the current regime at time 0 to the new arrange-
ment; i.e., co-management at present time t. The costs at stage one and two are the
transition costs or sunk costs of developing a co-management regime. These transi-
tion costs, therefore, represent a major part of the transaction costs involved in mov-
ing from a centralized management regime to a co-management regime. The costs in
stage one and two are for the nonrecurrent activities, while the costs in stage three
are continuous or recurrent. The evaluation of the transaction costs of co-manage-
ment will involve valuing both the recurrent and nonrecurrent costs at the three stag-
es and comparing them with the cost of the management activities under a central-
ized regime.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
In welfare analysis the Pareto criterion is used to judge whether one approach to
overcoming an externality is better than another. As stated by Griffin (1991), once
transaction costs are admitted, different property rules give rise to different welfare
frontiers. Each of the property rules will also exact its own unique magnitude and
distribution of transaction costs. Implementation of different property rules, liability
rules, regulations, incentives, customs and behavioral standards, and other
nonmarket devices, therefore, represent separate institutions with distinct economic
consequences. The inherent transaction costs of each specification of each institu-
tion will produce an institutionally specific production possibility frontier and utility
possibility frontier.
Co-management of fisheries involves the implementation of different property
rules, liability rules, regulations, incentives for resource extraction and distribution.Abdullah, Kuperan, and Pomeroy 112
As discussed earlier, the institution of these property rules involve transaction costs
that will alter the production possibility frontier. The challenge is to determine
whether the frontier will be moved in or out as the result of the implementation of
the new institutional arrangement. There is a need to empirically evaluate the nature
of the transaction costs involved in fisheries co-management institutions as a basis
for evaluating the efficiency or net benefits of co-managed fisheries compared to
centrally managed fisheries. The discussion presented in this paper will serve as a
basis for further operationalization of the three categories of transaction costs and
for empirical case study analysis.
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